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Team Success and Personnel Allocation under the National Football League
Salary Cap
Abstract
In this study, I employ economic theory in evaluating the concept of skilled allocation of labor capital in
the NFL market. The next sections include a survey of related literature and my theoretical structure. The
explanation of the data set and the empirical model follow that, trailed by the results of, conclusion to,
and further avenues for research generated by the model.
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Team Success and Personnel Allocation
under the National Football League
Salary Cap
John Haugen
Introduction
KH 1DWLRQDO )RRWEDOO /HDJXH 1)/  LV DQ
especially interesting market in which to
study labor economics. The salary cap
rule of the NFL — that each team is permitted
WKH VDPH ¿[HG DPRXQW RI PRQH\ WR VSHQG RQ
its player personnel — allows for controlled
comparison between teams and players. Because
team success depends on the combined output
of its players, knowing on whom to spend these
limited dollars is valuable information. Managers
and coaches analyze a player’s statistics, discuss
KLPZLWKDQRWKHUPDQDJHUZDWFK¿OPRIKLVSDVW
performance, and hold special workout sessions
to determine his potential contribution to the
WHDP¶VVXFFHVV,IDSOD\HULVGHHPHGEHQH¿FLDO
he will be offered a contract or a trade will be
made to obtain his services. This contract awards
D ¿[HG VDODU\ DQG PD\ LQFOXGH RQH RU PRUH RI
several types of bonuses—signing, performancebased, option, etc. Most bonuses are amortized
across the length of the contract and added to the
salary to obtain a player’s “cap value”. Cap value
refers to the amount a player is paid that counts
against the salary cap during a given season. I
FRQVLGHUWKLV¿JXUHWREHWKHGROODUHTXLYDOHQWRI
the player’s expected output and contribution to
team success.
From a managerial perspective, the goal is
to pay top talent as little as possible to maximize
overall team talent. Recognizing rising performers,
signing them to a cheap initial contract, and then
capitalizing on their rise to stardom a major method
of achieving such results. This requires expertise
and managerial skill; each NFL team must allocate
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its salary cap wisely to be competitive. There is
no way around the salary cap; all money paid to
the players must, at some point, count against the
team’s cap. Therefore, it is the responsibility of
the personnel manager to build a combination of
players that will maximize wins during any given
season.
A major aspect of a team manager’s duties
LV WR ¿JXUH KRZ PXFK KLV WHDP VKRXOG VSHQG
on types of players. For example, some teams
choose to spend more on their defensive backs,
some on skill position players, some on kickers,
etc. Frequently teams will build around a core of
WKUHHWR¿YHSOD\HUVZKRPWKHIURQWRI¿FHGHHP
exceptional. By looking at the amounts a team
spends on types of players, I analyze how these
W\SHV FRQWULEXWH WR WHDP VXFFHVV  6SHFL¿FDOO\ ,
search for a trend among recent NFL teams that
would indicate the marginal effect of any additional
GROODUV DOORFDWHG WR D VSHFL¿F W\SH RI SOD\HU  ,
posit that there are one or more types of players
that are more conducive to a team’s success; how
,GH¿QH³W\SH´DQG³VXFFHVV´DUHFUXFLDOHOHPHQWV
of my study upon which I expound in Section II.
Because the NFL is a multi-billion dollar
industry and winning greatly improves a team’s
RYHUDOOEUDQGDQGSUR¿WDELOLW\WKLVVWXG\SURYLGHV
insight to those interested in the game and also to
team managers and owners. Though undoubtedly
teams have conducted similar studies to attempt
WR ¿QG D WUHQG DQG SRWHQWLDOO\ LQFUHDVH ZLQV QR
economic literature I have found has researched
this topic in the manner in which this paper is
conducted. In this study, I employ economic
theory in evaluating the concept of skilled
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allocation of labor capital in the NFL market. The
next sections include a survey of related literature
and my theoretical structure. The explanation of
the data set and the empirical model follow that,
trailed by the results of, conclusion to, and further
avenues for research generated by the model.
I. Review of Literature
.DUO (LQROI   DQDO\]HV WZR
commonly studied markets in sports economics:
0DMRU /HDJXH %DVHEDOO 0/%  DQG WKH 1)/
&LWLQJWKHGLIIHUHQW¿QDQFLDOVWUXFWXUHLQHDFKRI
WKHVHOHDJXHVKH¿QGVDVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHLQ
WKHOHYHORIIUDQFKLVHHI¿FLHQF\EHWZHHQWKHWZR
leagues. The revenue sharing system in the NFL
yields a more egalitarian distribution of revenue
than in MLB, causing a more competitive market.
Since revenue is the major determinant of a
team’s payroll, teams invariably carry a payroll
comparable to their competitors. As a result,
“MLB franchises, with little revenue sharing and
QRVDODU\FDSWHQGWREHOHVVHI¿FLHQWWKDQ1)/
IUDQFKLVHV´  
Einolf writes an excellent survey of the
inherent differences between a freer market
like MLB and a strictly regulated market like
the NFL. Because MLB teams are allowed to
limitlessly spend on player personnel, issues such
DV PDUNHW VL]H WKH RZQHU¶V ¿QDQFLDO FDSDFLW\
and fan attendance have a very strong impact on
payroll size and team success. Larger markets
bring higher revenue potential to the ownership,
allowing for more liberal and extensive spending
on player personnel. In the NFL, under its
FRQYHQWLRQV RI SUR¿W VKDULQJ DQG D VWULFW VDODU\
cap, the aforementioned issues do not have as
large an impact. Most NFL teams spend roughly
the same amount on their players and share
revenues to compensate for varying attendance
¿JXUHV  (LQROI SUHVHQWV D FRPSHOOLQJ FDVH IRU
the use of a salary cap and establishes that the
¿QDQFLDOFDSDELOLWLHVRIWKHWHDPGRHVQRWKDYHD
large effect on the success of an NFL franchise.
Because each team can afford the same caliber of
players, the differences between teams lie in the

management of its salary cap and the combination
of personnel.
+HQGULFNV HW DO   DQDO\]H WKH
impact of uncertainty on the hiring process in
the NFL. Their models generate hypotheses
about the relationship between hiring patterns
and productivity. There are various estimates of
individual NFL success, which suggest statistical
GLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGRSWLRQYDOXHLQÀXHQFHFKRLFH
in this market. Managers tend to rely on prior
knowledge and statistics in choosing what types
of contracts to offer. Essentially, this study
supports my idea that teams do not necessarily
NQRZLIDFRQWUDFWRIIHUZLOOEHQH¿WWKHWHDPEXW
they must sign talent based on perceived potential
value to the team. The general manager’s skill
DQG IRUHVLJKW LQ UHFRJQL]LQJ WKH PRVW EHQH¿FLDO
combination of players eventually determines, to
a large extent, the success of the team.

/HZLV   SURYLGHV D H[FHOOHQW
framework and approach to the idea that the more
a team spends on its players the more success it
ZLOOKDYH While he analyzes a different market
in that of MLB, his maxim—that spending fewer
dollars and allocating them wisely can be more
advantageous to a team’s success—also applies
to the NFL. He studies the Oakland Athletics,
which, as of late, have enjoyed a great deal of
success in the form of regular-season wins and
playoff appearances. The Athletics’ payroll is
substantially smaller than the payrolls of most of
its competitors due to the small revenue stream in
Oakland and the ownership’s strict obedience to
their objective of spending less money wisely to
get more.
However, because NFL teams spend nearly the
same amount on their player personnel, any
parallel between Lewis’s work and my study must
be altered. In MLB, if a team can spend less and
still consistently compete with the teams that
spend three to four times as much as do they, it
PXVW EH GXH WR WKHLU LQFUHDVHG HI¿FLHQF\ LQ WKH
DOORFDWLRQ RI WKHLU PRQH\   (I¿FLHQW DOORFDWLRQ
of resources works yields success just as a large
payroll; solid performance in either category can
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spell success in MLB. However in the NFL, teams
are bound to operate within the salary cap. Their
ability to succeed as a team—namely their ability
to win more games than the others—can only be
DFKLHYHGWKURXJKHI¿FLHQWDOORFDWLRQ,QVSLWHRI
these differences, Lewis’s concept remains the
same: it is not necessarily KRZ PXFK money a
team spends but RQZKRP it is spent that can yield
more wins.
/HHGVHWDO  VKRZWKDWIUHHDJHQF\
and the salary cap brought profound changes to
the level and nature of players’ salaries in the
NFL. They also outline that football players
DUH HYDOXDWHG E\ SRVLWLRQVSHFL¿F VWDWLVWLFV
supporting the grouping of players by position
for comparison purposes. They analyze
GDWD IRU VSHFL¿F SRVLWLRQV WR GHPRQVWUDWH
how free agency and the salary cap affect
compensation, positing that it has increased
competition among the labor supply, the
players. This article gets to the heart of the
performance-by-position stance that I take;
because there is a limited amount of money
to be paid to the players, they have become
more competitive. The salary cap has made
DQ HI¿FLHQW PDUNHW RXW RI 1)/ E\ VROYLQJ
many of the issues inherent to a market such
as MLB: spending is limited and allocation
and performance are now integral.
This selection of research yields three
main ideas. First, each team’s success is
dictated by its management, not necessarily
by the size of its payroll. The major disparity
between teams that win and teams that lose is
WKHGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHHI¿FLHQF\RIVDODU\FDS
allocation. Second, in the NFL, spending
more money — relative to other teams under
the salary cap — will not itself yield more wins.
7KLUG WKH HI¿FLHQF\ RI WKH 1)/ DQG LWV ODERU
market has caused a more competitive labor supply
and has increased the leverage that management
possesses over the players. These ideas indicate a
high level of managerial control over their teams
DQG KLJKOLJKWV WKH YLWDOLW\ RI ¿QGLQJ WKH ULJKW
combination of players.
58

II. Theoretical Structure
The human capital theory states that
laborers will receive a wage that corresponds
to their projected output. This projected output
is based on past performance and potential for
success. Theoretically, teams should be spending
the most on the players that help them the most.
I analyze which types of players yield the most
success. Because the variety of positions in
football contribute differently to a team’s ability to
ZLQ,JURXSWKHVSHFL¿FSRVLWLRQVLQWRFDWHJRULHV
RU³W\SHV´7KLVDQDO\VLVÀRZVGLUHFWO\IURPWKH
GH¿QHGQDWXUHRIHDFKSRVLWLRQDVLWUHODWHVWRWKH
team’s ability to win (the positional duties are
RXWOLQHGLQ7DEOH 

Within each position there are various subtypes of players. For example, there are middle,
strong-side, and weak-side linebackers within
the LB position. I do not differentiate between
these types; their jobs are roughly the same and
for the purpose of this study are considered one
group. The same is done when grouping the other
positions. I consider the expenditure in dollars
RI HDFK WHDP RQ HDFK W\SH RI SOD\HU DV GH¿QHG

The Park Place Economist, Volume XIV

John Haugen
LQ 7DEOH   WR EH UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI WKH VNLOO DQG
ability of that group of players. Higher spending
on a type of player should indicate a stronger set of
players at that position. If that stronger group of
players helps yield team success, sending a higher
DPRXQWRQWKHPZLOOSURYHEHQH¿FLDO
I measure levels of team success by the
¿QDOQXPEHURIZLQVDWHDPDFKLHYHVLQDSDUWLFXODU
season. To assist in the explanation of the theory
of this paper, I employ a theoretical model that
is related to the standard isoquant and budget
constraint model in microeconomics. Because
the isoquant model “shows all the possible
combinations of inputs that yield the same output”,
it allows for concise analysis of the theory inherent
WRWKHVDODU\FDSFRQVWUDLQW 3LQG\FN 
It is best understood in graphical form, and the
graph presented in Figure 1 can be related to any
team in the NFL in any given season. For the sake
of this theoretical explanation, assume there are
two groups of players: “Group X” and “Group
Y”.
7KH [D[LV LV WKH GROODU ¿JXUH WKDW WKH
team spends on its Group X players; the y-axis
represents the same for Group Y players. The line
stretching from the y-axis to the x-axis is the salary
cap, naturally considered the budget constraint in
this model. Since every position falls under either
WKH*URXS;RU*URXS<FODVVL¿FDWLRQWKHVDODU\
cap constrains all team spending on personnel
and forces the money to go to one of the groups.
Every team in the NFL is allowed to spend up
to that point without going a dollar over. Each
LVRTXDQW²VSHFL¿FDOO\ WKH GRZQZDUG VORSLQJ
convex curves—represents a number of wins that
a team can attain in a season.
The isoquants are convex because the
nature of the two groups: Group X and Y players
are imperfect substitutes. As the amount spent on
Group X increases, the amount spent on Group
Y decreases. A team entirely composed of either
group would fail to win because each group is
necessary. Each isoquant that is further from the
origin represents one more win than the last. The
isoquants approach Z , the highest number of wins

achievable by that team during that season. The
points at which the isoquants intersect the salary
cap limit are individual spending amounts that a
team could choose. For example, point B indicates
a possible spending level for the example team.
It corresponds to a small expenditure on Group

X and a large expenditure on Group Y. Because
WKLV LV QRW D YHU\ HI¿FLHQW VSHQGLQJ V\VWHP LW
intersects the isoquant that corresponds to only 4
wins. NFL teams play 16 games in a season, and 4
wins is not very successful. If they spent at point
A, however, they will win 8 games. The team in
this graphical example, while winning a mediocre
8 games, represents exactly how allocating away
from Group Y and toward Group X will yield an
increase in wins. The points where the isoquants
intersect the salary cap line (with the exception
of the tangency point of Z  DUH LQHI¿FLHQW DQG
therefore correspond to fewer wins. As the wins
increase, the optimal spending point is reached
where isoquant Z* is tangent to the salary cap
line. The next isoquant, Z  RU Z   LV QRW
pictured as it would be beyond the salary cap limit
and therefore unattainable for that team.
However, in this case, starting at point B
we see that Group X players are more conducive
WR ZLQQLQJ JDPHV GXH WR VSHFL¿F YLWDO VNLOOV
needed to play their positions. These skills relate
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directly to a team’s ability to win. A dollar spent
on a wide receiver may be more valuable to the
team than the same dollar if it were spent on an
offensive lineman because the wide receiver can
GLUHFWO\DGYDQFHWKHEDOOGRZQWKH¿HOG,Q)LJXUH
1, this is indicated by the slight slant of the line
from the origin down toward the x-axis. Spending
a slightly higher amount on Group X will yield
more wins. I hypothesize that spending more
RQVSHFL¿FW\SHVRISOD\HUVZLOOGLUHFWO\DIIHFWD
team’s ability to win.

amount into 2004 dollars to control for the effects
RILQÀDWLRQDOVRVFDOLQJWKHGROODU¿JXUHVWREHLQ
millions of dollars to create more understandable
variables. As is evident by looking at the data
IRXQGLQ7DEOH±3RVLWLRQDO'DWD WKHUHLVZLGH
variation between teams and what they spend on
each group of player. Because these data suggest
that there is no rubric by which all teams are
comprised, my hypothesis—that there are groups
of players on whom spending money proves more
EHQH¿FLDO²FDQEHWHVWHG

III. Data
I use data for each of the 32 NFL teams over
the 2000-2004 seasons published at USAToday.
com. This amounts to 158 individual team seasons
due to the expansion in 2002 from 31 to 32 teams.
I have the full salary cap information for each
team; for each team and for each season, every
player that received a salary or bonus is included.
For each player I have data detailing position,
salary, the amount of signing and other bonuses,
the amortization of these bonuses across different
seasons, the type of these bonuses, and the “cap
value” of every player. I standardize the dollar

IV. Empirical Model
I employ an OLS regression with my
dependent variable as the number of regular season
wins for each team in each season. I treat the
same franchise’s different seasons as independent
of each other; i.e. the data for the 2002 Minnesota
Vikings have no impact on that of the 2003
Minnesota Vikings, amounting to 158 individual
and unique observations.
My independent
YDULDEOHVDUHWKHGROODU¿JXUHVHDFKWHDPVSHQGV
RQ W\SHV RI SOD\HUV VSHFL¿FDOO\ GHVLJQDWHG LQ
this regression by position (as outlined in Table
   $QRWKHU YDULDEOH ³8QXVHG´ PHDVXUHV WKH
dollar amount that was not spent
by the team but could have been
spent—i.e. seasonal salary cap
minus total team payroll. My
HTXDWLRQIRUWKH¿UVWUHJUHVVLRQLV
as follows:
Wins = A + B &%  
G '(   D '7   E .  
Z /%   H 2/   Q 3  
I 4% 


+ K 5%   L 6   M 7(  
N :5
To
control
for
multicollinearity, I follow the
¿UVW UHJUHVVLRQ ZLWK WZR VLPLODU
regressions, each time excluding
variables that were shown to be
WKHPRVWLQVLJQL¿FDQWLQWKH¿UVW
regression.
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V. Results

7KH UHJUHVVLRQ VXSSRUWV WKH LGHD ¿UVW
HVWDEOLVKHGE\/HZLV  WKDWWKHUHDUHFHUWDLQ
positions which are consistently more conducive
WKDQ RWKHUV WR ZLQQLQJ  7KHVH EHQH¿W D WHDP
insofar that increasing spending on those players
is statistically shown to increase the ability of a
WHDPWRZLQ6LJQL¿FDQWUHVXOWVDUHREWDLQHGE\
this study, also indicating that there is a level of
managerial control over the success of a NFL team
as posited by Hendricks et al. This model does not
WHVWWKHUHVHDUFKRI/HHGV  RU(LQROI  
research, but does rely heavily on the theory each
establishes. The regression results are found in
Table 3.

The adjusted R-Square values for each
of the regressions indicate that I do not explain
the entire picture. I plan to improve the values in
IXUWKHUUHVHDUFK(DFK³%´YDOXHLVWKHFRHI¿FLHQW
For example, increasing spending by $1 million
on a team’s Tight Ends will create 0.400, 0.399,
and 0.419 more wins, respectively, according to
UHJUHVVLRQVDQG7KHRWKHUFRHI¿FLHQWVFDQ
be interpreted similarly. The results indicate that
the Kicker, and to a lesser extent, the Tight End,
KDYHDODUJHGHJUHHRILQÀXHQFHRQDWHDP¶VDELOLW\

to win and that a Punter does not. Because the
Kicker is responsible for scoring more points than
any other player, he is valuable. In spite of this,
WKHDYHUDJHWHDPVSHQWRYHUWKHODVW¿YHVHDVRQV
only $854,000 on its kickers.
Surprisingly the players whom many
believe to be integral and on whom much attention
is focused—the Quarterback, Wide Receivers, and
HYHQ /LQHEDFNHUV²GLG QRW SURGXFH VLJQL¿FDQW
results. This could be because spending on these
players is not necessarily completely correlated
with talent; that is, teams may overspend or pay
bargain prices on their talent at these positions.
Also to be considered in explaining the model is
the potential for injury. Players always receive a
paycheck, injury or not. If
a star player receives a $10
million cap value and then
gets injured, my model does
not test for that. Injuries
are common among WR,
QB, LB, and other more
physical positions. The K,
P, and to a large extent the
TE are positions that do not
experience as many injuries,
and therefore, teams can
essentially get what they
pay for when they buy their
athletes.
VI. Conclusion
This study supports the
hypothesis that there are
W\SHV RI SOD\HUV WKDW DUH EHQH¿FLDO WR D WHDP¶V
ability to win and types of players who do not
contribute as much. Lewis’s 0RQH\EDOO  LV
DOLJQHGZLWKWKLVVWXG\,WDOVR¿QGVWKDWWKHUHLVQR
one “recipe for success” in the NFL and each team
could combine any number of different ways and
can still succeed. The study indicates that there
is a high constraint placed on managerial latitude
by the salary cap and it is up to the executor of the
team to allocate his money wisely. This position
LV WDNHQ E\ +HQGULFNV   DQG /HHGV  
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and is supported by this study.
I must acknowledge that my model may
be incomplete for two reasons. First, the timing
of signing bonuses and other types of bonuses
PD\ LQÀXHQFH WKH VL]H RI D WHDP¶V VDODU\ FDS LQ
a given year. This is to say that a team can pay a
player $10 million in one year, only attributing $1
million to salary and $9 million to a performancebonus. If the player signs a contract for two years,
he will make $10 million against the cap in the
¿UVW\HDUDQGRQO\PLOOLRQLQWKHVHFRQG\HDU
This averages out to $5.5 million per season, but
does not count in the salary cap as such. As such,
teams may not be “starting from scratch” each
year because team expenditure for each season
depends largely on the expenditure during other
seasons.
Second, wins may be a suspect dependent
variable. As the number of wins in a season is
¿QLWHWKHDYHUDJHDPRXQWRIZLQVLVDOZD\VJRLQJ
to be 8. I am not sure if this causes any real
problem, but it could confound my results. For this
reason, in my continued research, I will attempt
to implement a playoff variable to the equation.
Possible other methods include forming different
groups not based on position to see how they affect
wins. For example, I can analyze how spending a
KLJKDPRXQWRQWKUHHWR¿YH³VXSHUVWDUV´DQGOHVV
RQWKHUHVWRI\RXUWHDPLQÀXHQFHVZLQV
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